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Abstract
We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects
cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and
cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction
durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate coopera-
tion. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative
types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen
long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than
exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term
relationships provides a means for fostering—and screening for—efficient coopera-
tion.
∗. Department of Economics, University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zürich. FS (correspond-
ing author): frederic.schneider@econ.uzh.ch; RW: roberto.weber@econ.uzh.ch.
1
1. Introduction
The problem of how to obtain voluntary cooperation—i.e., when cooperation is otherwise
difficult to achieve, perhaps because relevant behaviors are not contractible or directly
observable—is central to the social sciences. Finding simple and generalizable ways to
facilitate cooperation among interacting individuals is of primary importance in social
policy and in organizational and market design.
One natural way to facilitate cooperation is through long-term interaction between
individuals, as when parties commit to each other contractually for a long period of time
(Friedman 1971; Kreps et al. 1982). Indeed, laboratory experiments that exogenously
vary the interaction horizon of players in prisoner’s dilemma, gift-exchange, and public
good games (Andreoni and Miller 1993; Gächter and Falk 2002; Dal Bó 2005) show that
longer (expected) interaction between parties facilitates cooperation.1
In this paper, we study the endogenous development of long-term interaction and its
effects on cooperation. While the benefits of long-term interaction for facilitating cooper-
ation are well established, an important open question is the extent to which individuals
will voluntarily agree to lengthy contracts that commit them to interacting with the
same counterparts for long periods of time. That is, are people willing to voluntarily
commit to long-term interactions? The benefits of doing so might be less salient than
the potential risk of committing to interacting with an uncooperative counterpart, and
the resulting possibility of exploitation.
Moreover, if people do voluntarily commit to long-term interaction, what effect does
such endogenous determination of interaction duration have on voluntary cooperation,
relative to when it is exogenously imposed? For example, do different types of people
differentially select long-term interaction, resulting in different samples and degrees of
cooperative behavior, relative to when everyone is in long-term interaction? Or, even
if there is no differential selection, does the act of having voluntarily chosen long-term
commitment make a pair more likely to cooperate? These questions are important because
1. Camera and Casari (2009) show that private reputations and punishment threats are key factors
to uphold cooperation in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas.
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the answers will indicate whether people can use willingness to commit as a way to screen
their interaction partners for cooperativeness.
To answer these questions, we use a laboratory experiment with a finitely-repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game to study exogenously imposed and endogenously selected
long-term interaction. To abstract from other features of interaction that may affect the
choice of long-term interaction and resulting cooperation, we construct a highly stylized
and simple environment in which players are provided with no information on opponents
prior to selecting whether to commit to one selected at random. Thus, our experiment
differs substantially from other related research that considers ”partner selection” or
"break-ups" of existing relationships in Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Hauk and Nagel 2001;
Page, Putterman, and Unel 2005; Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara 2009; Jackson
and Watts 2010) and in which players decide whether to (continue to) play with other
players after observing how cooperative they have been in the past.2
We begin with experimental conditions in which we exogenously vary the finite time
horizon confronting interacting players. Consistent with prior research, we find that longer
interaction horizons yield significantly higher cooperation rates.
We then study, as our focus, conditions in which individuals choose for how long
they want to interact with a randomly-determined opponent. That is, in conditions with
endogenous interaction duration, subjects do not select with whom to interact, but rather
simply for how long they wish to interact with someone, selected at random. We vary
the length of contracts available, with in some cases players having the option to commit
to play with the same counterpart for the entire experiment. Importantly, while the
interaction horizon varies, the stage game is always the same in our experiment.
We also elicit, separately, a measure of each subject’s intrinsic cooperativeness and
belief about the prevalence of cooperative types in the population. These measures
allow us to independently identify a subject’s social “type,” as a way to investigate how
differences in cooperativeness and beliefs affect the endogenous selection of interaction
durations.
2. For related theoretical work, see Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Rob and Yang (2010).
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Our experiment is motivated primarily by three questions. First, when people have the
option to commit to long-term interaction with the same counterpart, do they voluntarily
agree to such an option? Given the benefits of exogenously imposed long interaction
horizons for cooperation, are such benefits realized when people decide for themselves
for how long to interact? Or, does a “fear of commitment”—for instance, an aversion to
the possibility of being paired with someone who always defects—lead people to select
short-term contracts that are less effective for facilitating cooperation?
Second, we ask who opts for long-term commitment—is it those who are the most
or least inclined to cooperate? People who like mutual cooperation may prefer long-
term commitment, because they can use repeated game incentives to discipline potential
defectors and induce mutual cooperation. On the other hand, selfish people may prefer a
one-shot environment if they think there are enough “suckers” on whom they can defect
with impunity. So, an environment in which people can freely choose whether or not to
commit to long-term interaction may lead to self-selection according to people’s social
types.
Finally, a third central question deals with the effects of endogenously-chosen inter-
action durations on cooperation. Do people who voluntarily agree to interact for longer
periods of time cooperate more than those for whom similarly long interaction horizons
are exogenously imposed? There are at least two reasons why this might be the case. First,
selection by cooperative types into long-term contracts may make these contracts better
for fostering cooperation than when everyone is forced into such contracts. Additionally,
the willingness to enter into such contracts may convey additional information that facil-
itates cooperation. That is, players’ willingness to commit to long-term interaction may
provide a signal of the action that they intend to play in a manner that further facilitates
subsequent cooperation. So even if the type distribution is kept constant, the “institution”
of endogenous commitment could foster cooperation. We explore both possibilities in our
data.
Previewing our results, our data corroborate earlier findings that longer interaction
horizons increase average cooperation rates. However, our experiment also reveals that
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many subjects are reluctant to commit themselves to these longer durations, especially
initially. This reluctance is more pronounced in subjects whom we classify as selfish,
according to an independent measure of subjects’ social types. Subjects classified as
conditional cooperators, on the other hand, are more likely to self-select into commitment
early on and throughout the experiment. Endogenous commitment results in significantly
improved cooperation rates—in one of our conditions, the rate of cooperation is very
close to 100 percent. These high cooperation rates are only partly explained by the
differential sorting of selfish and conditionally cooperative types. Therefore, our results
identify voluntary long-term commitment as a mechanism for facilitating cooperation,
both by its differential appeal to types that differ in cooperativeness and through a more
direct influence on behavior.
There are situations outside the laboratory in which interacting parties endogenously
select the length of their relationship. For example, contractual relationships, as in em-
ployment, are usually for endogenously-specified periods of time. Similarly, professional
partnerships and marriages generally involve lengthy or permanent voluntary commit-
ment to one another by interacting parties. Of course, in the above situations, parties
often have some information about each other prior to committing to long-term relation-
ships, and they also often have the possibility of exiting the relationship, though perhaps
at significant costs. However, instead of mimicking such concrete “real-world” situations
in the laboratory, our design deliberately abstracts from these features to study the effect
of long-term commitment, in isolation. That is, we used the PD as the stage game, a
game that embodies a social dilemma in a simple, two-person, binary decision situation,
and excluded any other confounding factors or complications such as endogenous partner
choice, information about past actions, or the ability to exit relations prematurely. By
stripping away everything else, we tried to create the cleanest and simplest test of the
pure commitment effect on cooperation.
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2. Theoretical Analysis
Our main interest lies in (1) investigating whether subjects opt for long-term commitment
when it is available, and whether such commitment preferences differ by social type, and
(2) comparing cooperation and earnings under long-term commitment with those under
one-shot pairings and with those under exogenously imposed long-term commitment.
We consider an environment comprising both selfish players and other players who
prefer to reciprocate cooperation. The basic intuition of the formal analysis below is
that (1) everyone should opt for long-term commitment and (2) the set of equilibria is
unchanged by the introduction of voluntary long-term interaction, relative to that under
similar exogenously-imposed long-term commitment.3 By choosing long-term interaction,
conditional cooperators can protect themselves against continued exploitation by selfish
players. That is, after being exploited once, the conditional cooperator learns the type
of her opponent and has the possibility to avoid future losses by switching to defection,
too. This is not possible in the one-shot option because there, the conditional cooperator
faces a string of unknown opponents. Since conditional cooperators prefer long-term
contracting, choosing the one-shot environment guarantees an encounter with a selfish
player, meaning that selfish players cannot gain by attempting to exploit the one-shot
interactions by defecting on conditional cooperators. Consequently, selfish players also
universally select the long-term option. Such pooling leaves the set of equilibria in the
game with voluntarily chosen long-term commitment identical to that when similarly
long commitment is exogenously imposed. In particular, there exist behaviorally similar
equilibria in which even selfish types cooperate “rationally” until the last periods of
the repeated interaction. In addition, there also always exist equilibria with universal
defection, in which case the choice of interaction duration is irrelevant.
To investigate which (pure-strategy) Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria exist when
players can choose the duration of commitment to a randomly selected opponent, we
consider a very simplified, “gang of four”-style model with heterogeneous players (Kreps
3. See the appendix for a more detailed exposition of the theoretical analysis and proofs that form
the basis for this section.
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et al. 1982). An interaction involves two players, drawn at random from the population,
playing a generic PD. Table 1 shows players’ payoffs. Payoffs for mutual cooperation
and mutual defection are normalized to 1 and 0, respectively, and r > 1 > 0 > q and
0 < r + q < 2.4
We assume two types of players: selfish players and conditional cooperators. Both types
maximize their undiscounted von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, as given in Table 1.
For the selfish type, these utilities coincide with the monetary payoffs of the game (1, 0,
r, and q). Conditional cooperators (CC’s), however, prefer to cooperate if the partner
cooperates and prefer to defect if the partner defects. We model such preferences through
a psychic cost that makes their temptation payoff, r′, worse than the cooperative payoff,
1, so that 0 < r′ < 1 < r. Types are private information, but all players hold rational
and commonly known beliefs about the distribution of types in the population.
Table 1: Payoffs in a generic PD. For conditional cooperators, the temptation payoff r
is reduced to r′ < 1.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 1, 1 q, r
(′)
D r(′), q 0, 0
2.1. Exogenous Interaction Horizons
We first consider the case in which the number of periods with a fixed opponent is
exogenously imposed. Specifically, assume that there are T total periods of interactions,
or repetitions of the game, but that each random pairing of players lasts for some fixed
number of periods, S ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. For simplicity, assume that T = 2, meaning that
either S = 1 (i.e., players play in two one-shot interactions) or S = 2 (players are paired
with the same counterpart in both periods of the game).
4. Colombo and Merzoni (2006, 2008) consider a bilateral relationship with endogenous length. How-
ever, their model uses a trust game, and they do not study the signaling and sorting properties of the
equilibria.
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Suppose first that S = 1. Then, we have a string of two one-shot PD interactions. In
a one-shot game, a selfish player will always defect, regardless of her belief about the
other player, because defection is the dominant strategy. The conditional cooperator
will cooperate only if her belief, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, that the other player is also a conditional
cooperator is sufficiently high, namely b ≥ − q/1− r′ − q. Since our focus is on cases in which
the cooperative equilibria can arise, we assume that the share of conditional cooperators
in the population is sufficiently high to allow this. Note, however, that defection is also
an equilibrium strategy because even conditional cooperators defect if they believe other
conditional cooperators will do so.5 Thus, cooperation is possible whenever the frequency
of conditional cooperators is sufficiently high, but universal defection always remains an
equilibrium.
Next, suppose that S = 2, meaning that players are paired at random in the first
period but then play twice with the same opponent. Because the second period is the
last period in the repeated game, we have the same two equilibria as in the one-shot case,
where cooperation can be supported only if b ≥ − q/1− q − r′. However, in the first period,
cooperation can now be supported as an equilibrium strategy for both types. Specifically,
when b ≥ 1− 1/r, an equilibrium exists in which both types of players cooperate initially,
selfish players always defect in the second period (“rational cooperation”), and conditional
cooperators use a trigger strategy, that is, they cooperate in the second period only if
their opponent cooperated in the first period.
Finally, consider two settings with the same number of total periods, e.g., T = 4, and
with one involving longer interactions (S = 4) than another (S = 2). Under the above
cooperative equilibrium, the setting with S = 4 will yield higher overall cooperation rates
and aggregate payoffs than the setting with S = 2, because the former contains just one
end-game period, in which cooperation breaks down because the selfish types defect with
certainty. This intuition highlights the first prediction for our experimental results.
5. If two conditional cooperators face each other, and their type is common knowledge, they are
effectively playing a stag hunt coordination game.
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Prediction 1 (Cooperation in the Repeated Game with Exogenous Horizons)
Holding the total number of periods constant, cooperation will be more frequent, and
thus average payoffs will be higher, when players are exogenously matched for one longer
interaction horizon rather than for multiple shorter ones.
2.2. Endogenous Interaction Horizons
What happens if players can choose, ex ante, between a long-term commitment option,
in which they are paired with the same opponent for multiple periods (e.g., a “commit”
option, or S = 2) or a series of one-shot PD’s with different opponents (S = 1)? Both
the selfish players’ behavior in the PD and players’ commitment choices hinge on the
cooperativeness of the CC’s in the two commitment options. Recall that selfish players
will always defect in the one-shot option, but in the “commit” option, they can be induced
to cooperate rationally if the CC’s cooperate conditionally. Thus, if CC’s cooperate in
neither of the two options, then the selfish players will also always defect; the commitment
choice is then irrelevant as both options yield a certain payoff of zero.
However, equilibria that involve cooperation by CC’s imply pooling. To see why, con-
sider first that if CC’s are cooperative in just one option, all players will choose this
option. For instance, if CC’s cooperate in the “no commit” (S = 1) option but defect in
the “commit” (S = 2) option, the selfish players will still defect in both options. Moreover,
both types will pool on “no commit” because, for the CC’s, the prospect of encounter-
ing other cooperating CC’s outweighs the loss from meeting defecting selfish players,
and selfish players follow the cooperating CC’s. On the other hand, if CC’s cooperate
conditionally in the “commit” option but defect in the one-shot option, this will induce
the selfish players to cooperate rationally in the “commit” option. Both types will prefer
this to mutual defection in the “no commit” option, resulting in pooling on “commit.”
Finally, if CC’s cooperate (conditionally) in both options, the selfish players will cooper-
ate rationally in the “commit” option. Since repeated interaction is more attractive for
CC’s in this case, they will commit, and the selfish players will follow. In general, CCs’
payoffs are not only higher in expectation in the “commit” option, the variance of their
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payoff is also lower, and these differences become more pronounced as the interaction
horizon increases. We therefore expect that the equilibrium with pooling on the “commit”
option, conditional cooperation by CC’s, and rational cooperation by selfish players will
be preferred.6
To summarize, if the equilibrium strategy of the CC’s contains cooperation, then both
types will pool in their choice of interaction horizon. Because beliefs over types remain
unchanged if players pool on the same commitment option, this also means that the set
of equilibria available in the repeated game with an exogenously imposed interaction
horizon, S, is identical to when players endogenously choose this time horizon.
Prediction 2 (Pooling on Endogenous Interaction Horizons)
With endogenous choice of interaction horizons, there is no equilibrium where each type
chooses a different commitment option, except under universal defection. Equilibrium
cooperation when interaction horizon S is endogenously selected will coincide with that
when the same horizon is imposed exogenously.
This prediction essentially states that the availability of endogenously selected interac-
tion horizons will have no impact beyond simply making available the equilibria possible
under that option, when exogenously imposed. This is because all equilibria—except ones
with universal defection—involve pooling between the two types. Thus, beliefs about the
composition of different types under a particular interaction horizon coincide with those
when a particular horizon is exogenously imposed on the entire population.
2.3. Behavioral Prediction
The analysis above suggests that allowing endogenously chosen interaction durations
should have little effect beyond when similar interaction durations are imposed exoge-
nously. This is driven by pooling of conditional cooperators and selfish types in their
commitment choices. However, one of our motivating intuitions is that long-term interac-
tion may appeal differentially to different types. Therefore, we next attempt to provide
6. This is also in line with the experimental evidence on exogenous durations of the finitely-repeated
PD, cited in the introduction, that repeated games yield higher payoffs than one-shot games.
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a simple example, using a model of bounded rationality, of how such differential sorting
may occur.
Specifically, above we assume that players possess rational beliefs about the proportions
of the two types of players, and that their equilibrium beliefs about the proportions of
players they encounter by selecting a particular interaction horizon are also accurate.
Suppose, however, that players do not hold such rational beliefs, but instead possess
heterogeneous beliefs about the rationality of their opponents, as in models of “level-
k reasoning” or “cognitive hierarchies” (e.g., Nagel 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and
Broseta 2001; Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004; Ellingsen and Östling 2010). In this section,
we show how a simple model of this variety can produce the prediction that different
types select different contract durations. While while this analysis is simple and ad hoc,
it captures the intuition motivating our central behavioral hypothesis.
Assume, as in our earlier discussion, that T = 2 and that there are two possible in-
teraction horizons, S = 1 and S = 2, among which subjects choose. Our analysis above
shows that, in any equilibrium in which conditional cooperators act cooperatively after
selecting a particular interaction horizon, selfish types will follow the conditional cooper-
ators, resulting in pooling. That is, if conditional cooperators select a long interaction
horizon and subsequently cooperate, selfish players will also select the long interaction
horizon.
Now assume instead, however, that players believe their opponents choose contracts at
random (as in Level-0 behavior), and that the cooperative equilibrium obtains under either
interaction horizon.7 Because Level-0 players choose their commitment non-strategically,
Level-1 players (who believe they face Level-0 opponents) will think that CC’s are
equally prevalent in both commitment options. It is straightforward to show that, in the
above scenario, for players with Level-1 beliefs, the one-shot interaction will be more
attractive for selfish types if and only if there are enough Level-0 conditional cooperators
on whom they can defect. More precisely, if b > 1/r, then the expected share of conditional
7. That is, suppose that, among those who select S = 1, conditional cooperators cooperate and selfish
types defect; among those who choose S = 2, both types cooperate in the first period and, in the second
period selfish types defect while conditional cooperators reciprocate prior opponent behavior.
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cooperators is high enough for the selfish types to choose the one-shot interaction. Level-1
conditional cooperators (who believe that the other players randomize) will always prefer
S = 2 because, in the first period, they are guaranteed a payoff of 1. Thus, at level 1
behavior, only selfish types will choose the one-shot interaction.
Level-2 types, on the other hand, will recognize that there are more selfish types
in the one-shot environment, and conversely expect higher proportions of conditional
cooperators in the long horizon environment. They will therefore tend to choose the
longer interaction horizon. Thus, these non-equilibrium beliefs are more likely to support
cooperative equilibria in the endogenously chosen long interaction horizon, than when
such a horizon is exogenously imposed on everyone. We therefore expect the prevalence
of cooperative behavior to be higher in the longer time horizon than when a similar time
horizon is exogenously imposed, due to the differential sorting of selfish and conditionally
cooperative Level-1 types.
Prediction 3 (Limited Strategic Reasoning)
Due to limited strategic reasoning, we expect pooling to be imperfect initially. In particular,
selfish types are likely to favor the one-shot option, relative to conditional cooperators.
Cooperation will initially be higher in the endogenously chosen long interaction horizon.
3. Experiment Design
Table 2 shows the stage game Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) studied in the experiment.
The same game was used in two stages: a first stage in which we elicited behavioral
(social) types and a second stage, constituting the main part of the experiment, in which
the game was repeated 150 times with exogenously and endogenously varying interaction
horizons.
3.1. Stage 1: Eliciting Behavioral Types
At the beginning of the experiment, after initial instructions, participants played a se-
quential PD one time. In this first stage, we used the strategy method to elicit a subject’s
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behavior both as a first mover and as a second mover. In section 4, we discuss how we
construct social types based on the two choices made in the one-shot game.8
Subjects were randomly and anonymously paired. They then indicated a choice, A
(= cooperation) or B (= defection), in case they would be selected as the first mover.
Then, they indicated their choice as a second mover, conditional both on whether the
first mover cooperated or defected.
Participants did not receive feedback from this stage until after the main part of the
experiment. Specifically, at the end of the experimental session, the computer randomly
chose one subject in each pair to be the first mover and the other to be the second
mover, and implemented the corresponding choices. We kept this first PD identical
across treatments and instructions for the main part of the experiment (stage 2) were
distributed only after the sequential PD was over. We also made clear that subjects’
choices, matching, and payoff in the first stage were inconsequential for and unrelated
to the second stage.
Table 2: Payoffs in the experimental Prisoner’s Dilemma (in ECUs)
Player 2
A B
Player 1
A 40 6540 5
B 5 2065 20
3.2. Stage 2: Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
After the sequential PD, subjects played a total of 150 periods of a simultaneous PD
with the same payoff matrix as in the first stage (see Table 2). In each session, subjects
were grouped into matching groups of 14 or 16 subjects. Subjects only encountered other
subjects from their own matching group.
8. In an otherwise unrelated experiment, Burks, Carpenter, and Goette (2009) also conduct a sequential
PD to categorize social types in their but they only use second mover behavior for their classification.
In contrast, we use both first- and second-mover behavior to construct our types.
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The 150 periods were divided into 15 sets of 10 periods each. The meaning and relevance
of these sets varied by treatment condition. Our two treatment dimensions are (1) how
frequently subjects were re-matched and (2) whether the re-matching frequency was
exogenous or whether subjects chose how frequently they would be rematched. Concerning
the frequency of re-matching, subjects could be committed to the same opponent for
only one period (denoted as “N” for “No commitment”); for one 10-period set (denoted
as “I” for “Intermediate commitment”); or for all remaining periods of the experiment
(denoted as “P” for “Permanent commitment”).
3.3. Conditions with Exogenous Interaction Horizons
We implemented three different conditions with exogenously determined interaction
horizons in player matches. In these conditions, re-matching occurred at pre-specified
and publicly known time intervals. In each of these exogenous (EXO) conditions, subjects
received instructions that specified how regularly re-matching would occur, and stating
clearly that re-matching would be random.
In the Exogenous, No Commitment (EXO-N) condition, subjects were randomly re-
matched within their matching group after every period. Thus, subjects played in 150
1-period matches.
In the Exogenous, Intermediate Commitment (EXO-I) condition, subjects were ran-
domly re-matched within their matching group after every 10-period set. Thus, subjects
played 15 10-period matches.
Finally, in the Exogenous, Permanent Commitment (EXO-P) condition, subjects re-
mained matched with the same partner for all 150 periods of stage 2. That is, they were
matched with the same counterpart for the entire experiment. In this case, the pair was
also the matching group.
3.4. Conditions with Endogenously Chosen Interaction Horizons
In addition, we conducted two conditions in which subjects could choose, ex ante, for
how long they wanted to commit to play with the same partner.
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In a CHOICE-NI session, subjects chose before each 10-period set between no commit-
ment, i.e., random re-matching after every period of the set, or intermediate commitment,
i.e., a fixed pairing for the duration of the 10-period set.
In a CHOICE-NIP session, subjects could additionally choose permanent commitment,
which would match them with a randomly selected counterpart for the remainder of the
session. Thus, for example, if selected at the beginning of the first set (period 1), this
matching option would pair a subject with the same partner for all 150 periods of the
stage. If selected at the beginning of the second set (in period 11), this option would
match a subject with the same partner for all remaining 140 periods. Once a subject
entered a permanent match, the pairing was irreversible. In this condition, subjects could
also choose the intermediate (10-period) or no commitment (1-period) options, as in the
CHOICE-NI condition.
In these two CHOICE conditions, after subjects expressed a preference for a particular
interaction horizon, the computer formed pairs of subjects who had chosen the same
commitment option (no commitment, intermediate commitment, or, in the CHOICE-
NIP, permanent commitment). Because perfectly implementing subjects’ commitment
choices requires that even numbers of subjects choose each option, sometimes a subject’s
choice could not be implemented. To resolve such cases, we started with the longest
commitment option available in each condition (intermediate commitment in CHOICE-
NI and permanent commitment in CHOICE-NIP). The computer verified whether there
were an even or odd number of subjects selecting that option. If the number was even, then
the choices were implemented by randomly matching these subjects. If the number was
odd, one subject making this selection was selected at random to be matched according
to the next longest interaction horizon (no commitment in CHOICE-NI and intermediate
commitment in CHOICE-NIP). In CHOICE-NI, this procedure guaranteed an even
number of participants in each interaction horizon. In CHOICE-NIP, it was still possible
that an odd number remained then in the intermediate commitment option, in which case
the computer would randomly select a subject who had chosen intermediate commitment
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to be matched according to the no commitment option.9 This procedure was explained,
clearly, in the instructions.
Importantly, in both CHOICE conditions, subjects chose the number of periods to be
paired with a randomly assigned partner. That is, they did not choose the specific partner,
nor did they know anything about the specific partner, other than that the person had
(most likely) selected the same interaction horizon. This distinguishes our research from
related research on endogenous partner choice in which players make matching decisions
with information about prospective partners (see, for example, Hauk and Nagel 2001;
Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara 2009).
Table 3 summarizes our five treatment conditions. The check marks indicate the
commitment options available in each condition, at the beginning of each ten-period
set. The table also shows the number of subjects in each condition, and the number of
independent matching groups.
Table 3: Summary of treatment conditions: interaction horizons available in each con-
dition; number of subjects (N) and matching groups (k)
Duration of match N k
1 Period 10 Periods All remaining
EXO-N X — — 32 2
EXO-I — X — 58 4
EXO-P — — X 30 15
CHOICE-NI X X — 71 5
CHOICE-NIP X X X 76 5
Total 267 31
9. We designed this mechanism to minimize instances where a decision could not be implemented. For
subjects who chose the “no commitment” option, implementation probability was 100%, by default. For
subjects who chose “intermediate commitment”, the realized probability of this choice being implemented
was 93% in CHOICE-NI and 94% in CHOICE-NIP. For subjects who chose “permanent commitment”
in CHOICE-NIP, the probability of this choice being implemented was 93%.
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3.5. Experimental Procedures
This experiment was conducted in English at the Department of Economics at the
University of Zurich. The experiment was computerized, and participants made their
decisions privately and anonymously.10 268 students from the University of Zurich and
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich participated in the experiment.11 In
each session, only one of the treatment conditions was conducted, and each participant
took part in only one treatment (between-subjects design). None of the participants were
students in economics or psychology. A session lasted about 1.5 hours and the participants
earned about 45 CHF on average. Instructions are reproduced in the appendix.
4. Results
We first present the results of the type elicitation, using the one-shot sequential PD. We
then proceed to analyze cooperation in the second stage of the experiment, which is the
main focus of our paper.
4.1. Types
We used the sequential PD in stage 1 of the experiment to identify social types and
beliefs about others’ types. According to their second-mover behavior, subjects were
categorized as “selfish” (defect regardless of what the first mover chooses) or “conditional
cooperators” (CC, i.e., reciprocate cooperation with cooperation and defection with
defection). According to their first-mover behavior, both the selfish subjects and the
conditional cooperators were classified as “optimists” if they cooperated as a first mover
and “pessimists” if they defected. We choose this terminology because both selfish subjects
and conditional cooperators only cooperate if they believe that there is a high probability
10. Recruitment was conducted using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
11. One subject in the CHOICE-NI condition got sick during the experiment and had to leave her
session before the end of the experiment. A research assistant who was unaware of the purpose of the
study replaced this subject for periods 41 to 150. We exclude the data for this subject from the sample.
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that the second mover is a conditional cooperator. So, in terms of the model we presented
earlier, first-mover behavior is a binary indicator of a subject’s belief, b. Finally, subjects
who always cooperated—both as first and as second mover—are classified as “altruists”,
and the remaining subjects as “inconsistent”.
Table 4 summarizes the classification. For example, the first row corresponds to subjects
who always defected, and are therefore classified as “pessimistic and selfish” (pSE). This
type comprises roughly half of our sample. Overall, selfish subjects (those who always
defect as second movers) make up about 60 percent of the sample, conditional cooperators
slightly more than one third.12 A negligible proportion is either altruistic or inconsistent.
Of the selfish subjects and the conditional cooperators, roughly two thirds are pessimistic
(defect as first movers), and one third is optimistic. Interestingly, beliefs and social types
are correlated: conditional cooperators are almost four times as likely to be optimistic
as selfish subjects (p < 0.01, Chi-squared, N = 257).
Table 4: Classification of Social Types
1st-mover choice 2nd-mover response Type Frequency
after cooperate after defect
defect defect defect Pess. Selfish (pSE) 51.7 %
cooperate defect defect Opt. Selfish (oSE) 9.7 %
defect cooperate defect Pess. CC (pCC) 13.1 %
cooperate cooperate defect Opt. CC (oCC) 21.7 %
cooperate cooperate cooperate Altruist (Alt) 1.9 %
— all other combinations — Inconsistent (Inc) 1.9 %
4.2. Exogenous Conditions
In Stage 2 of the experiment, subjects played 150 repetitions of the PD, in varying
conditions. In our analysis, we put an emphasis on the first period, before subjects have
received feedback for the first time. In this period, we can still treat each individual action
12. Comparing the type distribution across conditions, selfish and conditionally cooperative subjects
make up the majority of subject types in all conditions. We fail to reject equality of proportions of
types across conditions, indicating that randomization of types was successful (p = 0.29, Chi-squared,
N = 267)
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as an independent observation, which greatly increases statistical power. We begin by
analyzing the three exogenous conditions: EXO-N, EXO-I, and EXO-P. Figure 1 shows
the development of the average cooperation rate over time.
As expected, the average cooperation rate increases with the duration of the commit-
ment. Cooperation and earnings are very low in the EXO-N condition, where subjects are
rematched in every period. Despite slight increases at the beginning of every 10-period
set, cooperation rates are rarely sustained above 10 percent, after the first few sets.
Figure 1: Cooperation Rate over Time in Exogenous Conditions
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Ra
te
 (%
)
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131 141 151
Period
EXO−N EXO−I EXO−P
Cooperation rates in the two conditions with longer exogenously-imposed interaction
horizons, EXO-I and EXO-P, are considerably higher. After the initial sets, cooperation
rates are regularly above 80 percent. Cooperation is more frequent under permanent
commitment (EXO-P), mainly due to the removal of the intermediate end games. That
is, a large part of the difference between EXO-P and EXO-I is due to the decline in
cooperation near the end of every 10-period match in the latter (a result similar to that
obtained by Andreoni and Miller 1993).
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Overall cooperation rates in the three conditions are: 11.5 percent (EXO-N), 63.5
percent (EXO-I), and 83.5 percent (EXO-P), see also Table 6. Using the matching group
as the unit of observation, the distributions are significantly different (p = 0.03, Kruskal-
Wallis Test, N = 21). Pairwise comparisons of the differences between conditions also
generally reveal significant differences (EXO-N vs. EXO-I: p = 0.06, Mann-Whitney-U,
N = 6; EXO-I vs. EXO-P: p = 0.05, Mann-Whitney-U, N = 19; EXO-N vs. EXO-P:
p = 0.05, Mann-Whitney-U, N = 17).
As a direct consequence, earnings are also generally higher with longer exogenously
imposed commitment. Specifically, the average profit per period in the EXO-N condition
is 27.2 ECU versus 34.8 ECU in the EXO-I condition, and 37.7 ECUs in the EXO-
P condition. Profit distributions are significantly different across these three conditions
(p = 0.03, Kruskal-Wallis Test,N = 21). Differences between all pairs of conditions reflect
similar significance levels to those for cooperation rates (EXO-N vs. EXO-I: p = 0.06,
Mann-Whitney-U, N = 6, EXO-I vs. EXO-P: p = 0.05, Mann-Whitney-U, N = 19,
EXO-N vs. EXO-P: p = 0.05, Mann-Whitney-U, N = 17).13
Result 1 (Cooperation and profits with exogenous long-term commitment)
On average, longer exogenously-imposed commitment increases cooperation and earnings.
Earnings and cooperation are highest under permanent commitment and lowest under no
commitment.
Our classification of social types is meaningful in terms of predicting first-period
behavior in EXO-N. While pessimistic selfish subjects overwhelmingly defect (15.8 percent
cooperation), optimistic CC’s predominantly cooperate (83.3 percent cooperation). The
difference in cooperation rates is significant (p < 0.01, Chi-square, N = 25).14 The
classification is also predictive of first-period behavior in the two conditions with repeated-
game incentives, EXO-I and EXO-P. In particular, optimistic CC’s cooperate at a much
higher rate in period 1 (90.9 percent) than the other three types—pessimistic (38.6) and
13. Again, in all of these comparisons, the unit of observation is the matching group.
14. In EXO-N, there are only three subjects who are optimistic egoists and two who are pessimistic
CC’s, making statistical inference for these types infeasible.
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optimistic (44.4) egoists, and pessimistic CC’s (30.0). The latter three frequencies are
statistically identical (p = 80.4, Chi-squared Test, N = 63), while the higher cooperation
for optimistic CC’s is statistically significant against all other three types (p < 0.01 for
all three comparisons, Chi-squared Test, N = 66, N = 31, and N = 32, respectively).
4.3. Endogenous Conditions: Commitment Choice
In the endogenous conditions, subjects have to indicate how they want to be matched
at the beginning of each 10-period set. In the CHOICE-NI condition, they can choose
between being randomly rematched after every period (no commitment, as in EXO-N)
or being matched with the same (randomly assigned) opponent for all 10 periods of the
upcoming set (intermediate commitment, as in EXO-I).
Figure 2: Rate of commitment choices over Time
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The first panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the matching choice distribution
over time in the CHOICE-NI condition. At the beginning of the first set, i.e., in period
1, about 35 percent of subjects choose the no commitment option. The average rate of
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subjects choosing this option drops permanently below 10 percent by set 8. Interestingly,
however, a small number of subjects continue to opt for no commitment throughout the
experiment.
In CHOICE-NIP, subjects have the additional option to be irreversibly paired with a
randomly assigned opponent (“permanent” commitment, as in EXO-P). The second panel
of Figure 2 shows the distribution of commitment choices, over time, for this condition.
We see that a very similar fraction of subjects initially chooses no commitment (32
percent), as in the CHOICE-NI condition. Similarly to CHOICE-NI, this fraction drops
permanently below 10 percent by set 5 and below 5 percent by set 11. Again, at the end
of the experiment, there remains a small residual proportion of subjects who persistently
opt for no commitment.
Most interesting in this condition is how many subjects opt for permanent commitment.
The fact that virtually everybody abandons no commitment in favor of some form of
commitment suggests that subjects realize the advantage of committing. Also recall the
significant benefits—discussed in our theoretical analysis and confirmed in the exogenous
conditions—of permanent commitment, in particular the obvious lack of intermittent
end-game defection. Nonetheless, subjects are very reluctant at first to choose this option.
Only 17 percent of all subjects in CHOICE-NIP choose permanent commitment in the
first set (one fourth of those who choose to commit). By set 5, this fraction increases
to about 35 percent, and finally plateaus in the last three sets of the experiment at 59
percent. Of those who commit by the end of the experiment, 39 percent still do not
commit permanently.
Result 2 (Fear of commitment)
About one-third of subjects opt for no commitment initially. Longer-term commitments
increase in prevalence over time, driving out one-period matches. However, a large pro-
portion, 41 percent of subjects, persistently avoids permanent commitment.
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Figure 3: Commitment Rate by Condition and Type, over Sets
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4.4. Which types opt for commitment?
We now consider whether different social types opt differentially for long-term commit-
ment. Since there is a time trend in commitment choice, we first ask which type initially
sorts into commitment, in period 1, and then consider who persistently avoids commit-
ment throughout the experiment.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of subjects opting for commitment over time, presented
separately for each subject type and condition. these graphs are analogous to those in
Figure 2, but with the commitment choices of each type presented separately.
In the first set, commitment is highest for optimistic conditional cooperators (oCC) and
lowest among pessimistic self-interested (pSE) types, and this is true for both conditions.
Only half of the pessimistic selfish subjects opt for commitment in either condition. At
the other extreme, 82 percent of optimistic CC’s opt for commitment in the first period
of the CHOICE-NI condition; in the CHOICE-NIP condition, the fraction is even higher,
92 percent. This is in line with our hypothesis that selfish subjects are more inclined
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to initially opt for one-period matches, while conditional cooperators favor long-term
commitment.
The possibility to commit irreversibly in the CHOICE-NIP condition has no effect
on the initial commitment rate of selfish subjects, but makes CC’s commit more often:
pessimistic CC’s are 20 percentage points more likely to choose some kind of commitment
in CHOICE-NIP than in CHOICE-NI, and optimistic CC’s are 10 percentage points more
likely. When permanent commitment is available, over 90 percent of optimistic CC’s (i.
e., those who are most likely to cooperate) opt for either intermediate or permanent
commitment from the start.
In Table 5, we test the relationship between types and commitment choices econo-
metrically, by regressing the decision to opt for some kind of long-term commitment—
intermediate or permanent—on binary variables indicating a subject’s type, a binary
variable for the CHOICE-NIP condition, interaction terms, and control variables. Looking
at model 2, optimistic CC’s commit significantly more frequently than pessimistic selfish
subjects (the excluded category) in both the CHOICE-NI and the CHOICE-NIP condi-
tions. Specifically, they are 29 percentage points more likely to commit in the CHOICE-NI
condition (p = 0.04) and 37 percentage points more likely in CHOICE-NIP (p = 0.01
in a Wald test). As mentioned above, optimistic CC’s are about 9 percentage points
more likely to commit in CHOICE-NIP than in CHOICE-NI, but this is not statistically
significant. However, while the CHOICE-NIP condition does not make any individual
type significantly more likely to commit than in the CHOICE-NI condition (i.e., none
of the CHOICE-NIP terms is statistically significant), the pessimistic CC’s are now also
more likely to commit than pessimistic selfish subjects—specifically, 33 percentage points
more likely and this difference is statistically significant (p = 0.06, Wald test). As model
3 shows, these results are robust to adding demographic controls (gender, age and Swiss
nationality), which are all insignificant, and controls that capture subjects’ risk and trust
attitudes.15
15. Of the eight trust questions, adopted from Glaeser et al. (2000), two are (marginally) significant
(“Trustworthiness”, p = 0.05 and “GSS Help”, p = 0.09); of the seven risk-related questions, taken from
Dohmen et al. (2011), three are significant: risk taking in sports and leisure (positively correlated,
p = 0.01), risk taking in professional career (negatively correlated, p < 0.01), and the amount invested
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Figure 3 also shows the development of commitment over time. At the end of the
experiment, optimistic CC’s are those who have chosen permanent commitment most
often (84.6 percent) in CHOICE-NIP. Intriguingly, pessimistic selfish subjects are by the
end more likely to have committed permanently (58.5) than pessimistic CC’s (37.5) and
optimistic selfish types (40).16
Result 3 (Optimistic conditional cooperators favor commitment)
Optimistic conditional cooperators initially choose commitment with the highest frequency
in either condition with endogenous commitment choices. Toward the end of the experi-
ment, optimistic conditional cooperators are the most likely to have opted for permanent
commitment.
These differences in the propensity to commit affect the type composition of subjects
interacting under the different commitment choices. That is, if one chooses commitment,
one is likely to encounter different proportions of subject types than in the population
as a whole. This is inconsistent with the pooling equilibria we identified earlier, and
provides a foundation for why the level of beliefs, b, necessary to support cooperation
may be more likely to be met under endogenously selected interaction horizons than when
everyone is assigned to a particular interaction duration. Specifically, as we hypothesized,
the proportion of cooperative subjects is likely to be higher under endogenously selected
commitment, relative to exogenously imposed commitment and to no commitment. This
makes cooperation more likely under voluntarily selected long-term commitment, relative
to when similar commitment is exogenously imposed, as the necessary optimistic beliefs
are more likely to be met.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of the population comprised by each type, in each
commitment category in the two conditions with endogenous interaction horizons. The
figure presents the proportions separately for the first 10-period set and in the final
in a hypothetical lottery (positively correlated, p = 0.02). We also include scores from both the Mach-IV
machiavellism inventory and the Cognitive Reflection Test; both are insignificant.
16. Note however that, after the first period, subjects have interacted with each other, so that our
unit of independent observation is now the matching group. Since we only have five matching groups of
condition CHOICE-NIP, the number of independent observations too small for statistical comparisons.
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Table 5: OLS Regression of Commitment Choice in Period 1. Outcome is 0 if no
commitment, 1 otherwise.
M1 M2 M3
oSE 0.181 0.221 0.342
(0.134) (0.246) (0.270)
pCC 0.206* 0.137 0.208
(0.110) (0.144) (0.148)
oCC 0.333*** 0.294** 0.361**
(0.100) (0.138) (0.144)
CHOICE-NIP 0.007 0.015
(0.108) (0.111)
oSExCHOICE-NIP -0.057 -0.277
(0.296) (0.321)
pCCxCHOICE-NIP 0.201 0.178
(0.231) (0.232)
oCCxCHOICE-NIP 0.092 -0.025
(0.203) (0.207)
Female 0.065
(0.100)
Age >= median 0.080
(0.090)
Swiss nationality 0.028
(0.083)
Survey controls? No No Yes
Constant 0.533*** 0.529*** 0.199
(0.053) (0.080) (0.230)
adj. R-squared 0.063 0.045 0.108
N 142 142 142
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In M3, the following controls from the exit questionnaire
were added: attitudinal measures for trust (8 items from Glaeser et al. (2000)) and risk (7 items, from
Dohmen et al. (2011)), a machiavellism score (from the Mach-IV inventory), and the score from the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).
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one. As a reference, we show the overall distribution of types in the respective condition
(labelled as “overall”).
Figure 4: Type by Endogenously Chosen Interaction Horizon, First and Last Set
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In the first set of both conditions, a subject is much more likely to encounter a self-
ish opponent when selecting the no commitment option than with longer commitment.
For example, in the CHOICE-NI condition, selfish subjects comprise 68 percent of the
population under no commitment, but only 46 percent under intermediate commitment
(p = 0.09, Fisher’s exact test, N = 71). A similar pattern obtains in the CHOICE-NIP
condition. In the first set, a choice of no commitment virtually guarantees that one
encounters a selfish counterpart (92 percent). With greater commitment, one encoun-
ters increasing proportions of conditional cooperators, and especially optimistic CC’s,
which make up a negligible proportion of the no commitment population, 18 percent of
the population under intermediate commitment and 38 percent of the population under
permanent commitment. Overall, one is much more likely to encounter a conditional
cooperator under permanent commitment (54 percent) than under no commitment (8
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percent, difference significant, p = 0.01, Fisher’s exact Test, N = 76).
Finally, we consider commitment choices near the end of the experiment. As we saw
above, by the end of the experiment, almost nobody remains in the no commitment
option (3 out of 71 subjects in CHOICE-NI and 2 out of 76 subjects in CHOICE-NIP).
However, in the CHOICE-NIP condition, almost 40 percent of subjects never opt for
permanent commitment. Figure 3 shows that, by the final set, the two commitment
choices, Intermediate and Permanent, are more similar in the overall distribution of types
than in the first set. However, the fraction of pessimistic CC’s is much larger in the
Intermediate commitment option (17 percent) than in the Permanent option (7 percent);
optimistic CC’s, on the other hand, are much more prevalent in the Permanent option
(24 percent versus 7 percent in Intermediate).
4.5. Endogenous Conditions: Cooperation Rate
We have shown that, initially, subjects are more likely to encounter a conditional cooper-
ator if they choose to commit, and in CHOICE-NI, even more if they choose to commit
permanently. We also know that conditional cooperators, especially the optimistic ones,
are more likely to cooperate initially. This means that, potentially, the longer-term com-
mitment options facilitate cooperation when chosen endogenously, as they yield both a
greater proportion of conditional cooperators and thus a greater proportion of counter-
parts likely to cooperate. That is, the endogenously chosen long-term commitment offers
more than the repeated game incentive to cooperate. It also produces a type composition
conducive to cooperation, due to a higher proportion of optimistic conditional coopera-
tors. This is particularly true early in the experiment, when the differential selection of
types into long-term contracts is most pronounced.17
17. Recall that our matching mechanism ensured that everybody in the highest commitment option
(“intermediate” in CHOICE-NI and “permanent” in CHOICE-NIP) was matched with somebody who
chose this option. Also, a subject whose choice was not implemented was guaranteed to be matched
with somebody who chose the implemented option. Finally, in any given set, somebody who chose no
commitment had a substantial chance of being matched with a participant who had been reallocated
to no commitment from intermediate commitment by the computer mechanism (46% in CHOICE-NI
and 24.6% in CHOICE-NIP); somebody who chose intermediate commitment in CHOICE-NIP had
a 6.7% chance of meeting somebody who had chosen permanent commitment but was reallocated to
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Table 6: Average Cooperation Rate (in percent) across commitment durations: exoge-
nous vs. endogenous commitment
1st Period of First Set 1st Period of Last Set All Periods
N I P aggr. N I P aggr. N I P aggr.
EXO 37.5 46.6 66.7 — 18.8 86.2 86.7 — 11.5 63.5 83.5 —
C-NI 14.3 76.7 — 52.1 16.7 89.2 — 83.1 9.0 72.5 — 63.5
C-NIP 7.7 37.5 100.0 35.5 25.0 83.3 100.0 89.5 4.5 63.9 97.8 70.7
Figure 5: Cooperation Rate over time across commitment durations: exogenous vs.
endogenous
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The left part of Table 6 presents the cooperation rates in period 1 in the different
treatment conditions, divided by commitment choice for the endogenous conditions.18
Compared to the cooperation rate in exogenously assigned one-shot interactions (38
percent), the rate is lower under no commitment in both the CHOICE-NI (14 percent)
and the CHOICE-NIP (8 percent) conditions (p = 0.02, Fisher’s exact test, N = 86).
This means that if subjects have the chance to opt out of the one-shot interaction, this
dramatically decreases the cooperation rate among those who nevertheless choose this
no commitment option.
In contrast, if subjects have voluntarily chosen to commit irreversibly (in CHOICE-
NIP), they all cooperate, while subjects who were exogenously assigned to this option
(EXO-P) only cooperate at a rate of 67 percent (p = 0.04, Fisher’s exact test, N = 40).
Thus, putting the above two results together, we find strong support for the hypothesis
that endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation that when
similar commitment is exogenously imposed.
Interestingly, the fact that more cooperative types sort into permanent commitment
only accounts for part of the above differences in cooperation rates: if we regress coopera-
tion on treatment condition and commitment duration dummies, the difference between
endogenous and exogenous commitment is unaffected by controls for social type (see
Table 7).19 We take this as an indication that voluntary permanent commitment affects
behavior not only by yielding different type compositions, but also by affecting subjects’
beliefs.20
Interestingly, there is no monotonic relationship for intermediate commitment. If sub-
intermediate commitment by the computer. Subjects whose commitment choice was not implemented
differed from those whose choice was implemented in their cooperation rates in the PD (see appendix).
18. The cooperation rates of the three exogenous conditions—EXO-N, EXO-I, and EXO-P—are the
same as in Period 1 of Figure 1, which shows cooperation rates across conditions and interaction horizons
over time.
19. The null hypothesis whether the coefficients EXO-P and CNIP-P are identical can be rejected
both without and with controls for social type and survey measures of risk, trust, and machiavellism
(p = 0.05 in M1 and p = 0.07 in M2, Wald tests). Results are robust to including the CRT score. Also,
the dependent variable is average cooperation within a set, but results are unchanged if we do not
aggregate, or if we take only first periods of each set.
20. One possible interpretation is that endogenously chosen long-term interaction facilitates equilibrium
selection on cooperative equilibria, in the manner of forward induction.
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Table 7: OLS Regression of Cooperation in the exogenous and Choice-NIP treatment
conditions, controlling for subjects’ social type. Dependent variable: individual
cooperation rate within a set.
M1 M2
EXO-I 0.527*** 0.517***
(0.061) (0.061)
EXO-P 0.715*** 0.719***
(0.081) (0.081)
CNIP-N -0.063* -0.043
(0.034) (0.049)
CNIP-I 0.536*** 0.547***
(0.034) (0.044)
CNIP-P 0.871*** 0.850***
(0.032) (0.045)
oSE 0.059
(0.041)
pCC 0.069*
(0.038)
oCC 0.108***
(0.033)
Survey controls? No Yes
Constant 0.107*** 0.007
(0.030) (0.068)
adj. R-squared 0.546 0.567
N 2805 2805
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors account for clustering at the matching-group
level. In M2, the survey controls are: trust and risk attitude, and machiavellism score.
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jects are exogenously assigned to play the first set with the same opponent (EXO-I
condition), 47 percent of them cooperate. When the 10-period commitment option is
the only available commitment option (in CHOICE-NI), this rate jumps to 77 percent
(p < 0.01, Fisher’s exact test, N = 101). But when permanent commitment is also avail-
able (in CHOICE-NIP), cooperation under intermediate commitment actually decreases
compared to EXO-I, to only 38 percent (p < 0.01, Fisher’s exact test, N = 83). Thus,
the cooperation-enhancing effect of commitment seems to be confined to cases in which
players select the highest available commitment option.
Result 4 (Voluntary Long-Term Commitment Increases Cooperation)
Voluntarily choosing the longest-term commitment option available increases cooperation
relative to when similar commitment is exogenously imposed. Conversely, voluntarily
choosing no commitment decreases cooperation.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we add to the literature that investigates the influence of the shadow
of the future on cooperation. In particular, we study how cooperation is influenced by
endogenously chosen interaction durations, when individuals know nothing about their
opponents beyond the kind of commitment choices that they made.
We find that, consistent with prior research, longer interaction horizons for an interac-
tion facilitate cooperation. Moreover, the longer the interaction the greater the prevalence
of cooperative behavior.
Importantly, we show that individuals realize these benefits of commitment and use
the opportunity to lock into long-term interactions. By the end of the experiment, almost
all participants choose some form of commitment.
However, we find at least two ways in which players’ reluctance to commit limits some
of the potential benefits produced by long-term interaction. First, we find that, initially,
over a third of subjects opt for no commitment, meaning that they interact with a different
counterpart every period, a situation very likely to yield mutual defection and low payoffs.
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Second, even though the willingness to be bound in long-term interaction increases over
time, we find that permanent commitment, which yields the highest cooperation rates,
is avoided by a persistently large proportion of subjects.
We also find that long-term commitment appeals differentially to different types, in
terms of social types that we identify separately from the main part of the experiment.
In early periods, commitment is spearheaded mostly by optimistic conditional coopera-
tors. In contrast to other studies where the influx of selfish subjects makes cooperation
break down (e.g., Bohnet and Kübler 2005), we find that selfish subjects who choose
long-term commitment “behave”, a sign that subjects achieve coordination on the rational-
cooperation equilibrium. So although conditional cooperators were in the minority in
our sample, their presence and the possibility to choose interaction durations was suffi-
cient to tip the scales in favor of commitment and cooperation.21 Optimistic conditional
cooperators are also most likely to commit permanently by the end of the experiment.
The persistent avoidance of commitment in our study is puzzling. As subjects realize
the merits of intermediate commitment in fostering cooperation, they should prefer
the permanent commitment all the more. However, while subjects move away from no
commitment to some commitment, many are reluctant to give up the possibility to
withdraw from commitment in the future, even if this comes both at a loss in expected
payoff and increased payoff variance. Such “fear of commitment” has also been studied
in psychology (Serling and Betz 1990), although there it describes how people adhere
to action plans, rather than relationships. Bowlby (1969) studies a phenomenon called
“attachment style”, a classification of people’s emotions and behavior with respect to the
parent-child relation and romantic relationships. Numerous questionnaire studies have
found that people are heterogeneous with respect to their attitude to attachment ranging
from “securely attached” to “avoidant” (for an overview, see Cassidy and Shaver (2008)).
Whether the fear of commitment observed in our experiment is related to such personality
21. Prior research has shown that whether one or the other type dominates aggregate outcomes is
dictated by the relevant institutions and norms in a particular setting (Roth et al. 1991; Fehr and Falk
1999; Henrich et al. 2001; Camerer and Fehr 2006). Our results suggest that enforceable commitment to
long-term interaction can be such an institution that helps the conditional cooperators shape aggregate
outcomes.
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traits remains to be investigated in future studies, as this could help identify its impact
in other economic contexts, such as labor markets and organizations.
Finally, one of our most important findings is that self-selection into a commitment
option has a significant effect on cooperation rates, especially initially. Those who actively
sort into one-shot matching cooperate significantly less than those who are exogenously
assigned into this option. Those who choose the longest possible commitment option
cooperate significantly more. The permanent commitment option, when chosen endoge-
nously, yields essentially universal cooperation. Importantly, sorting by type explains
only part of this gap, which suggests that people may use permanent commitment as a
device to coordinate efficiently on the cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, a comparison
between our CHOICE-NI and CHOICE-NIP conditions shows that once intermediate
commitment is not the longest possible commitment, it looses its value as a cooperation-
fostering institution. The willingness to commit for the longest available horizon thus
also serves as a way to screen the opponent for cooperativeness.
This goes beyond what prior research has shown. Vikander (2013) argued that in
finitely-repeated social dilemmas, the best way to sustain cooperation is through sorting,
whereby conditional cooperators manage to identify each other and to isolate themselves
from opportunistic, selfish people. We show that, while sorting plays a role, endogenous
commitment choice gives a large, lasting boost to cooperation even once almost everybody
chooses it and the sorting argument is thus of minor importance.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to isolate and investigate the cooperation-
enhancing effect of voluntary commitment to long-term interaction. This sort of contrac-
tually enforceable commitment is a defining element of firms, organizations and social
institutions. Because the self-selection effect creates higher levels of cooperation than
even the exogenously induced long-term commitment, we think that voluntary commit-
ment is a powerful advantage of organizations and can potentially explain their existence,
in addition to more standard accounts like governance improvements. The large effect
of irreversible commitment on the willingness to cooperate may be one reason why
many cultures historically encourage long-term commitment between adults, in the form
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of marriage (Phillips 1991). If marriage is a (quasi-) irreversible decision, it can serve
both as a commitment device to cooperation and a signaling device to credibly convey
trustworthiness (Matouschek and Rasul 2008, and references there).22
The endogenous choice of longer-term commitment may be one way to achieve “good
governance” in groups with the aim to uphold cooperation (Dixit 2009). While irreversible
commitment achieves very high cooperation rates, it is not taken up by everybody.
Further work should investigate whether contract types that offer more flexibility are
more attractive. Such a contract could be a commitment contract of indefinite duration
that allows unilateral termination at a penalty. While this construct seems more realistic
than the irreversible commitment in our experiment, it may still constitute a sufficient
commitment to ensure a high level of cooperation.
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Appendices
A. Cooperation Rate when Choice was not
implemented
The computer mechanism that implements subjects’ commitment choices in the endoge-
nous treatments may sometimes reassign a subject in case there is an uneven number of
subjects in the chosen option. In Figure 6, we show the differential cooperation rates in
the different commitment options of subjects who had chosen this option and those who
wanted to be in the next higher option but were reallocated to this option by the computer.
Those who were reallocated to “no commitment” display, initially, higher cooperation
rates. After having experienced the low level of cooperation in this commitment option
for a few periods, they reduce their cooperation to the low level of those who intended
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Figure 6: Cooperation rate within a set in endogenous conditions. Solid lines show
cooperation rate of subjects who chose the respective option; dashed lines
show the commitment rate of subjects who were reallocated to the option by
the implementation mechanism. Error bars indicate the standard error of the
mean, with the matching group as the unit of observation.
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not to be committed. In the intermediate commitment, subjects who had initially chosen
“permanent” commitment sustain a higher cooperation rate over a longer period of time.
B. Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we provide details of the formal analysis summarized in Section 2. We
study a signaling game consisting of the commitment choice (“Stage 1”) and an entailing
T -period Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), with or without commitment (“Stage 2”). We consider
a model with two types of players, as described in Section 2: selfish players who maximize
their monetary payoffs from the game and conditional cooperators who want to cooperate
with those who also cooperate in return. A player’s type is private information.
First, we provide a proof that, if the fraction of CC’s is high enough, then any cooper-
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ative equilibrium must entail pooling of types into commitment options. Then, we turn
to a simpler version of this game to illustrate our motivating intuition in the form of a
behavioral prediction.
To summarize the analysis, our first main result is that, under a reasonable behavioral
assumption, all pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the supergame involving
cooperative behavior—i.e., where commitment choices are not made irrelevant by uni-
versal defection—entail pooling by selfish and conditional cooperative types on the same
commitment choice. Intuitively, it is impossible for conditional cooperators to select one
type of interaction duration and cooperate, without the selfish types also choosing the
same interaction duration.
However, our intuition motivating the experiment was based on the belief that condi-
tional cooperators would be able to use the commitment choice to avoid selfish types, at
least to some extent, and that the selfish types would have a preference for not commit-
ting, so they could exploit cooperation by others more easily. Therefore, we also show
that it is possible, using a simple model of bounded rationality—the “level-k” approach
of limited strategic reasoning—to construct a behavioral prediction in which (Level-1)
conditional cooperators opt for longer commitment while (Level-1) selfish players do
not. This provides one possible theoretical account for the behavior we observe in the
experiment.
B.1. No Stable Separation of Types
In this section, we consider a finitely-repeated PD with two types of players, selfish and
conditionally cooperative. Let T be the finite, commonly known number of periods in
the game. Let at ∈ {D,C} be an action in period t of the PD, where D stands for
“defect” and C stands for “cooperate”. The period payoffs are given in Table 1. Payoffs for
mutual cooperation and mutual defection are normalized to 1 and 0, respectively, and
r > 1 > 0 > q and 0 < r + q < 2.
We assume two types of players: selfish players and conditional cooperators. All players
maximize their undiscounted expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, as given in
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Table 1. Selfish players realize a temptation payoff of r > 1. Conditional cooperators
(CC’s) prefer to cooperate if the partner cooperates and prefer to defect if the partner
defects. We model such preferences through a psychic cost that makes the CCs’ temptation
payoff, r′, worse than the cooperative payoff, 1, so that 0 < r′ < 1 < r.
The population of players is a continuum of non-atomistic players on the interval [0, 1],
where a fraction b is of the conditionally cooperative type and the complement, 1− b is
selfish. Types are private information, but all players hold the rational and commonly
known belief b about the distribution of types in the population. In particular, this means
that if a random opponent is drawn from this population, the probability of this opponent
being a CC is b, and this fact is commonly known by all players.
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to pure strategies.23 Players also recall their
personal history, hit, that is own play (aiτ ) and opponent’s play (aoppτ ) for each of the
previous periods, τ ∈ 1, 2, . . . t− 1. In each period, player i can condition his strategy on
the belief b and his personal history up to this period. Player i’s strategy for the T -period
game is then the vector si = {ai1(b), ai2(b, hi2), . . . , aiT (b, hiT )} ∈ S.
In our model, there are two different matching protocols, no commitment (nc) and
commitment (c). If a player is in the commitment protocol, he faces the same opponent
in all T periods of the game, so that this protocol makes the game a finitely-repeated PD
with matched opponent. If a player is in the no commitment protocol, a new opponent
is drawn randomly from the population, and the probability to meet the same opponent
again is almost surely zero, making each period a one-shot PD. This means automatically
that the strictly dominant strategy for selfish players in the nc condition is “always defect”,
sSEnc = {D,D, . . . D}.
23. Exploring the set of all equilibria, including those employing mixed-strategies, is complex in this
game. Allowing for mixed strategies preserves the finding that there are no fully separating equilib-
ria. However, semi-separating equilibria are possible where CC’s mix between commitment and no
commitment.
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B.1.1. Nash Equilibria with Exogenous Commitment
In this section we will establish that in finitely repeated PD’s, under both matching proto-
cols, there are both uncooperative and cooperative equilibria, if there are enough CC’s in
the population. Let us first look at the equilibria in a one-shot PD with random matching.
A Nash equilibrium in this game is defined as a pair of actions, a∗ =
{
aSE
∗
, aCC
∗}, where
aSE
∗ is the equilibrium action of a selfish player and aCC∗ is the equilibrium action of a
CC. A selfish player has a strictly dominant action, D, which means that aSE∗ = D.
For CC’s, there are two possible Nash Equilibrium strategies in the stage game. Like
the selfish players, CC’s may defect, as their best response to defection is also defection.
However, their best response to cooperation is also cooperation; so if all CC’s cooperate
and the probability b of being matched with another CC is high enough, then cooperation
is an equilibrium strategy for CC’s in the stage game. The threshold for the fraction
b of CC’s in the population is given by
¯
b = −q/(1 − q − r′). Below this threshold, the
only equilibrium in any one-shot or finitely repeated PD is universal defection by both
types. In the following, we will focus our analysis only on the case where b ≥
¯
b. The two
possible Nash equilibria in the stage game are then: {D,D} and {D,C}.
We will now define the Nash equilibrium for a T -period PD without commitment. In
this case, the Nash equilibrium is a pair of vectors, s∗ =
{
sSE
∗
, sCC
∗}, both of length T ,
and each element of the vectors, aSEt (b, hit) or aCCt (b, hit), describes a type’s action in the
respective period, given b and the personal history of the player. Furthermore, for ease
of notation, let s∗(τ) denote the pair of strategy vectors containing the first τ elements
of sSE and sCC , respectively.
As explained above, the nc condition is a string of one-shot PD’s, so selfish players
will always play the strictly dominant strategy, defect: sSEnc
∗
= {D,D, . . . D}. For CC’s,
an equilibrium strategy is defined by sCCnc
∗
=
{
aCC1
∗
(b), aCC2
∗
(b, hi2), . . . , a
CC
T
∗
(b, hiT )
}
,
where aCCt
∗
(·) ∈ {D,C}. In other words, the CC’s may have an equilibrium strategy
that prescribes defection in every period, cooperation in every period, or a strategy that
contains both defection and cooperation in different periods.
An informative value for the analysis of endogenous commitment will be the expected
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rate of cooperation, cˆ (s∗):
cˆnc (s
∗
nc) = b
1
T
T∑
t=1
aCCt
∗ (
b, hˆt (s
∗
nc(t− 1))
)
,
where hˆt (s∗(t− 1)) is the expected history that is produced by the given equilibrium
strategies, s∗nc, up to period t − 1. Note that, since selfish players will never cooper-
ate in the nc condition, 0 ≤ cˆnc (s∗nc) ≤ b. The expected per-period payoff of a selfish
player, who always defects in nc, given the equilibrium s∗nc, is EpiSEnc (s∗nc) = rcˆnc (s∗nc),
and 0 ≤ EpiSEnc (s∗nc) ≤ rb. Similarly, the CCs’ expected per-period payoff for any equi-
librium strategy is EpiCCnc (s∗nc) = q + (1 − q)cˆnc (s∗nc), and this value is bounded by
0 ≤ EpiCCnc (s∗nc) ≤ q + (1 − q)b. Note that b > ¯b implies (1 − q)b + q > 0, meaning the
CC’s’ expected payoff is positive. In contrast, in an equilibrium prescribing universal
defection, their expected payoff is zero.
The c condition matches players with a fixed opponent for all T periods. Since in
the stage game, defection is the dominant strategy for selfish players and is also an
equilibrium strategy for CC’s, universal defection is also a (subgame perfect) Nash
equilibrium: sdefectc
∗
= {{D,D, . . . , D}, {D,D, . . . , D}}. As has been shown by Kreps
et al. (1982), there also exist equilibria with cooperation as an equilibrium outcome,
provided that the probability of the opponent being a CC is sufficiently high. Consider,
for example, the following pair of strategies: CC’s play “grim trigger” by starting with
C in the first period and then continuing with C unless they have observed D at least
once in their history; if they do, they switch permanently to playing D. Selfish players
have the same strategy, except that, in the last period, they defect with certainty. Kreps
et al. (1982) call this behavior “rational cooperation”. This pair of strategies is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium if two conditions are met: first, because CC’s are required to
cooperate in the final period, even though the selfish players defect, the above condition
b ≥
¯
b has to be satisfied; second, for selfish players it has to be rational to cooperate in
all periods but the last if the opponent cooperated as well up to that point. In particular,
in the second to last period, T − 1, a selfish player has to trade off whether he wants
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to stick to the equilibrium strategy and earn 1 in T − 1 and an expected br in period
T against defecting in T − 1, giving him r in that period and 0 in T . Therefore, it is
necessary that 1 + br ≤ r or b ≥ 1− 1/r for this pair of cooperative strategies to be an
equilibrium.
The above example is the equilibrium with the highest cooperation rate, as both types
cooperate up to the second-to-last period. In the final period, SE’s will always defect as
the continuation value of their play drops to zero.24
B.1.2. Nash Equilibria with Endogenous Commitment
In the previous section, we have established that, with enough CC’s in the population,
there are both uncooperative and cooperative equilibria in the finitely-repeated PD with
exogenous matching protocol. We now turn to the main issue of this paper, the situation
where players can choose whether they play the PD in the c condition or the nc condition.
To investigate this situation, we extend the above model so that players can specify, ex
ante, which matching protocol they would like to have implemented when playing the
finitely-repeated PD. We will represent this decision by a variable that takes on the value
1 if the commitment protocol is chosen and 0 if the no commitment protocol is chosen.
Call this binary variable α for SE’s and β for CC’s. Whenever possible, players update
their beliefs about the prevalence of CC’s according to these choices and form the two
Bayesian posteriors
b′c =
βb
α(1− b) + βb b
′
nc =
(1− β)b
(1− α)(1− b) + (1− β)b,
where b′c is the probability of being matched with a CC in the c protocol, given b, α and
β, and b′nc is the respective probability in nc.
The natural solution concept in this framework is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(PBNE). We define a PBNE as a pair of strategy profiles: α∗, sSEnc
∗, sSEc
∗ for SE’s, and
β∗, sCCnc
∗, sCCc
∗ for CC’s. This pair is a PBNE if the strategies are mutual best responses
24. Allowing for mixed strategies allows for many more equilibria where selfish players start out
cooperating and switch to a mixed stage-game strategy at some point.
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given the equilibrium beliefs, and the belief system b′c and b′nc is consistent with Bayes’
rule as defined above, whenever it can be applied. The key question in this section is
which decisions α and β are part of a PBNE, or in words, which commitment options do
the different types choose? Our intuitive claim is that, leaving aside the trivial case where
nobody ever cooperates, in equilibrium, both types will choose the same commitment
option.
Proposition 1
Any PBNE equilibrium that is cooperative involves pooling.
Proof. We will prove this in two steps. First, we prove by construction that there
exist pooling equilibria for both commitment options. Then, we will rule out separating
equilibria by contradiction.
(1) Existence of pooling equilibria We first construct a simple cooperative equi-
librium for pooling on no commitment, that is, α = β = 0. Suppose that CC’s always
defect after choosing commitment, and that they always cooperate in no commitment.
The SE’s best-respond by always defecting in both commitment options. Both types
choose no commitment with certainty. SE’s have no incentive to deviate from defection
and CC’s have no incentive to deviate from cooperation, since b′nc = b (recall that we
look only at non-trivial cases where b ≥
¯
b). Likewise, no type has an incentive to deviate
to the “commitment” option, regardless of the out-of-equilibrium belief b′c because the
expected payoff there is zero, as both types deviate.25
Second, we construct a cooperative equilibrium for pooling on commitment, so α =
β = 1. To this end, we refer back to the equilibrium example we gave for the exogenous
commitment case above. Suppose now that CC’s always defect in nc but play a (condi-
tionally cooperative) grim trigger strategy in the c protocol. SE’s best respond by always
defecting in nc and cooperating rationally up to period T − 1 in c, and then defecting in
25. If nobody chooses to commit, the game is not defined for individual deviation to the commitment
option, as there are no opponents. We can accommodate this issue by assuming that there is an
infinitesimally small exogenous probability that the commitment choice is reversed. If we further allow
this probability to vary by player type, we can generate any Bayesian off-equilibrium belief 0 < b′c < 1.
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the final period. In the commitment choice stage, both types choose commitment with
certainty, hence b′c = b. As we have shown, SE’s do not have an incentive to defect before
the final period iff b ≥ 1− 1/r. Again, independent of the out-of-equilibrium belief, no
type has the incentive to deviate to the outside option, nc, as both types defect there.26
(2) No separating equilibria Next, we show that there cannot be any cooperative
equilibria where one type chooses one commitment option and the other type the other
option, so β = 1 − α. Because of the strict separation, opponents’ type is common
knowledge among players. That is, all players know that in one option, every player
will be of one type and in the other option, every player will be of the other type (that
is, b′ = 0 for the option chosen by the SE’s and b′ = 1 for the option chosen by the
CC’s). Since SE’s only have an incentive to cooperate in the commitment option, and
then only if there is a sizable probability of being matched with a CC, this means that
SE’s will defect with certainty in “their” option, giving them zero payoff. On the other
hand, CC’s can be certain to be among themselves and are supposed to exhibit some
cooperation (because we are looking for a cooperative equilibrium). Furthermore, because
this is a Nash Equilibrium, this payoff has to be positive (as switching to always defect
yields a minimum payoff of zero). But this provides an incentive for the SE’s to join the
cooperative CC’s: by switching to the other commitment option and defecting, they can
secure a strictly positive expected payoff, a contradiction. 
B.1.3. Irrelevance of Endogenous Choice for PD
Since in pooling equilibria everybody chooses the same commitment option, players’
updated belief will just be equal to the proportion of CC’s in the overall population,
b. But this, together with the requirement of the PBNE that the PD strategy must be
a best response given the updated belief, means that the set of equilibria in the PD
stage of the game has to be identical to the set of equilibria of the PD with exogenous
26. Recall that the set of players is defined as a continuum. This is convenient as it ensures that there
is an infinite number of opponents to draw from in the off-equilibrium nc option, but the number of
periods, T , is finite. Thus, the game in the nc condition remains a string of one-shot PD’s as long as it
is chosen by a positive proportion of players.
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commitment.
Corollary 1 (Irrelevance of Endogenous Commitment for PD Behavior)
In all Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the game with endogenous commitment choice,
the set of possible Nash Equilibria in the entailing repeated PD is the same as in the
repeated PD with the same exogenously imposed duration.
Universal defection is an equilibrium under all exogenous and endogenous commitment
durations. The two cooperative equilibria in the endogenous game involve pooling, which
means b = b′c = b′nc. So, for a fixed b, Nash equilibria of the T -period PD following
the commitment choice must be the same as those in the T -periods PD with the same
exogenously-imposed interaction duration. Thus, endogenous commitment choice is ir-
relevant with respect to the equilibria that result the ensuing PD.
B.1.4. Relative Attractiveness of Equilibria
Note that CC’s’ expected payoff is strictly higher in the pooling equilibrium involving
commitment than in the one involving no commitment, independent of the proportion
of CC’s, b:
EpiCCc
∗
= T − 1 + b+ (1− b)q > EpiCCnc ∗ = T (b+ (1− b)q)
Also, the difference between the two expected payoffs grows linearly with the number of
periods, T . So, for CC’s, the commitment equilibrium is the payoff dominant option, and
more so with a growing interaction horizon.27 Moreover, note that the variable part of the
payoff in the commitment equilibrium is the one Bernoulli trial in the final period, where
a CC either encounters another cooperating CC and receives payoff 1 (with probability b),
or encounters a selfish player and receives q (with probability 1−b). In contrast, a CC faces
this same Bernoulli trial in all T periods of the PD in the no-commitment equilibrium.
The payoff variance, therefore, is lower in the commitment equilibrium than in the no-
commitment equilibrium, and again, this difference grows linearly with the number of
27. Recall that an uncooperative equilibrium yields zero payoff with certainty.
48
periods, T . Indeed, a CC can only make lower payoffs in the commitment equilibrium
than in the no-commitment equilibrium if all the opponents in the no-commitment game
are CC’s, and the opponent in the commitment game is a selfish player. The probability
of this event, (1− b)bT , declines exponentially with growing time horizon. In short, for
CC’s, pooling on commitment is more attractive than pooling on no commitment, and
vastly so if T is large.
Selfish players, on the other hand, may prefer the no-commitment equilibrium in terms
of expected payoff. This is the case if there are enough CC’s in the population so that
the probability of earning r in any given period of the no-commitment game outweighs
the certain payoff of 1 in any of the non-final periods of the commitment game. Formally,
this is the case if b > 1/r. These observations regarding the relative attractiveness of
equilibria with different commitment options are the basis for our behavioral prediction
of initial sorting according to player type.
B.2. Initial sorting with bounded rationality
Following our earlier analysis, we should not expect separation between selfish and con-
ditionally cooperative players in commitment choices. This stands in contrast with the
intuition guiding our research—that, given the ability to select different commitment
options, CC’s will find longer-term commitment more attractive. Therefore, we now
show how a simple model of boundedly-rational behavior can provide an—admittedly, ad
hoc—formal basis for this prediction. One way of viewing this analysis is that the above
equilibrium predictions are what we expect in the long-run, but that limited strategic
sophistication may yield some separation between types in commitment duration, at
least initially. To make the point, we look at the two-period version of the above game
and introduce a simple form of bounded rationality.
We adopt a simplified Level-k framework, in which we assume some behavior on the
part of unsophisticated (Level-0) players, and then iterate best response over higher
levels of sophistication to generate behavioral predictions. Following other research (e.g.,
Crawford and Iriberri 2007; Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich 2008), we only make
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an assumption regarding the behavior of the Level-0 players.
Specifically, returning to the two player types that we defined earlier—selfish and
conditionally cooperative (CC)—assume that selfish types defect in the one-shot game
but cooperate rationally under commitment and that CC’s cooperate generally but, in
the commitment option, switch to defection iff their opponent defects (“grim trigger”).28
We also assume that half of the L0 players select one commitment option, and the other
half select the other option, independent of their type. As a consequence, the fraction
of CC players in the population of L0 players is equal to their proportion in the overall
population, b.
Following the literature, L1 players are then assumed to select a best response to the
behavior of L0 players, with knowledge of the proportion of CC types, or b. Similarly, L2
players select a best response to the behavior of L1 players.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Sorting with Bounded Rationality)
Suppose that (i) L0 players select commitment choices non-strategically and are equally
likely to opt for either choice, (ii) L0 selfish types play the PD strategy “always defect” in
nc and “rational cooperation” in c, and (iii) L0 conditionally cooperative types play the
PD strategy “always cooperate” in nc and “grim trigger” in c. Then L1 selfish types will
opt for no commitment iff b > 1/r, and L1 CC types will opt for commitment. L2 and
higher players of both types will pool on commitment.
Proof. This proposition uses the behavioral concept of finite levels of reasoning and
iterated best response. That is, players play optimally in the PD given their social type
and their belief, but they do not form this belief fully rationally. Instead, a L1 player
best responds to the belief that players choose the two commitment options equally often
and non-strategically, i.e., independent of type. This means that a L1 player expects to
encounter CC’s in both options with probability b. A L1 player also expects CC’s to
28. Note that, when b is high enough to support cooperation, the PD behavior yields weakly higher
payoffs for both players than the other PD equilibrium strategies, making it a natural choice for un-
sophisticated players. This case reflects the more general requirement for our behavioral prediction to
hold and on which our intuition is based, that strategically unsophisticated (L1) selfish types believe
that there are (L0) CC’s who choose the no commitment option but nevertheless cooperate.
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play the PD strategies “always cooperate” in the nc protocol and “grim trigger” in the
c protocol, and selfish players to play “always defect” in the nc protocol and “rational
cooperation” in the c protocol.
Anticipating these L0 strategies, an L1 CC player will strictly prefer the commitment
option and the c protocol strategy “grim trigger” because she can secure a payoff of 1
in the first period and prefers, in expectation, cooperation over defection in the second
period as long as b > − q/1− q − r′. A selfish L1, however, will prefer the no commitment
option iff there are enough CC’s in the population, to yield a higher expected payoff in
the first period of the one-shot option (br) than in the commitment option (1). So if
the selfish L1 players have an “optimistic” prospect of encountering many CC’s in either
option (i.e., b > 1/r), they will prefer no commitment and will defect in both periods of
the PD. Thus, the two L1 types separate into two different commitment options.
L2 players best-respond to the choices of L1 players. Because, for b > 1/r, selfish L1
types choose the one-shot option and defection, but L1 CC’s choose to commit and play
“grim trigger”, L2 players of either social type expect to encounter only defecting selfish
types if they choose no commitment; by the same argument, they expect to find CC’s
playing a trigger strategy if they choose to commit. This means that L2 CC’s will also
choose to commit. Moreover, selfish L2 players will also choose to commit and select
rational cooperation (CR) in the second stage. 
C. Subject Instructions
We present the complete instructions for the CHOICE-NIP condition, because this was
the most complex one. The instructions for EXO-N, EXO-I, EXO-P, CHOICE-NI, com-
prehension questions, questionnaire, and ztree files are available upon request from the
authors.






